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ABSTRACT 
Psychological ideas had always played a role on the formation of economic thought as 
can be seen in the works of many influential pre-classical and classical authors. Up to 
the beginning of the 20th century, there was almost no methodological objection 
regarding the incorporation of ideas from psychology into economic theories. After this 
period, a fundamental shift in mainstream economics took place which is also known 
as the Paretian turn. This conceptual change, initiated mainly by Vilfredo Pareto and 
completed with the emergence of the theories of choice in the first decades of the 20th 
century, attempted to expel all psychological notions from economic theory. However, 
in the last three decades, the increasing appeal of subjective well-being research and 
especially of the new behavioral economics, re-brought the topic onto the surface. In 
order to better comprehend and to contribute to the recent discussion concerning the 
relationship between the two disciplines, the study of relevant views found in history 
of economic thought is necessary. The paper starts with a brief sketch of the history of 
the relationship between economics and psychology, focusing also to the recent 
literature which points to a reconsideration of this relationship. After an examination of 
psychological ideas found in influential pre-marginalist writers, the paper discusses the 
arguments supporting the case for the interaction between the two fields.  It also 
suggests that the work of Richard Jennings can be seen as the peak of the early 
interaction between economics and psychology. Finally, it considers the relevance of 
these arguments for the current debate concerning the relationship between economics 
and psychology. 
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Ι. Introduction 
 
The theme of the relationship between economics and psychology has a long and rather 
complicated history. Psychology is considered as probably the closest neighboring field 
to economics. Psychological ideas had always played a role on the formation of 
economic thought even before the classical school of economics. The presence of 
psychological elements and observations became even more obvious in the works of 
major classical economists. The same trend can be observed with the emergence of the 
marginalist school and the shift towards the study of individual economic behavior. The 
marginalists were paying more attention to psychological ideas and especially to the 
particular theory of psychological hedonism (Drakopoulos, 1991; Wärneryd, 1994). Up 
to the beginning of the 20th century, there was almost no methodological objection 
regarding the incorporation of ideas from psychology into economic theories. After this 
period, a fundamental shift in economics took place which is also known as the Paretian 
turn (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). This conceptual change, initiated mainly by Vilfredo 
Pareto and completed in the first decades of the 20th century by John Hicks, Roy Allen 
and Paul Samuelson, attempted to expel all psychological notions from economic 
theory (Lewin, 1996; Frey and Benz, 2004; Hands, 2010). The main consequence of 
the establishment of axiomatic rational choice theory by the above authors, was that 
economics explicitly severed its ties from psychological research. The same trend 
continued in the following decades with the formation of the microfoundations’ and the 
‘rational expectations’ literature which extended rational choice theory to 
macroeconomics. The subsequent application of rational choice theory to most areas of 
economics such as public choice theory and labor economics, completed the Paretian 
turn of mainstream economics (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). 
      Although there has been continuous criticism of the isolation of economics from 
other social sciences and especially from psychology, the dominance of orthodox 
economics ensured the methodological justification and reign of the Paretian turn (Earl, 
1990; Lewin, 1996). However, in the last three decades, the increasing appeal of 
subjective well-being research and especially of the new behavioral economics re-
brought the issue onto the surface (Sent, 2004; Frey, 2008; Frantz, 2009). The 
relationship between economics and psychology and its ensuing methodological 
dimension is currently attracting increasing attention (Rabin, 2002; Bruni and Sugden, 
2007). In particular, one of the main characteristics of the new behavioral economics is 
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the criticism of mainstream economic rationality in terms of research findings from 
psychology. A very important consequence of these developments was that it re-opened 
the methodological issue of the role and the place of psychological assumptions in 
economics.  
      The issue of the relationship between economics and psychology effectively 
contains two central points which are the following: 1) To what extent do economic 
assumptions need to be based on sound psychology, and 2) the possibility of 
independence of economics from psychology (Lewin, 1996; Camerer and Loewenstein, 
2004, Frey and Benz, 2004). It is clear that these two points also exhibit a strong 
historical and methodological bend. Thus and in order to get further insights to the 
above, a substantial part of the relevant literature is focused on the history of the 
relationship between economics and psychology. The bulk of this literature deals with 
the relation between economics and psychology after the marginalist revolution. In 
particular, the strive of late marginalist/neoclassical economics to expel psychology 
from economic theory (Pareto, Slutsky, Hicks, Allen, Samuelson) is a well-researched 
topic (e.g. Hands, 2010). Given the recent discussion of re-introducing psychological 
elements in economics mainly in the context of behavioral economics, other papers 
focus on the history of behavioral economics since WWII. In general, most of the 
research concentrates to the period that followed the marginalist revolution and only 
mentions briefly the historical developments before that period (see for instance, 
Angner and Loewenstein, 2012; Nagatsu, 2015; Earl, 2016). Thus, there is a 
considerable gap which lies on the earlier ideas on the role of psychology in economics. 
In fact, for many pre-marginalist major authors, the issue of incorporating 
psychological elements in economic discourse was also an important theme. There are 
many such examples in the works of Whately, Banfield, Lloyd, and Gossen. More 
detailed discussion and arguments can also be found in the economic thought of Senior 
and Jennings. 
      In order to contribute to the recent discussion concerning the relationship between 
the two disciplines, the focus of this paper is on the works of early authors on this 
subject. An investigation of the views regarding psychological ideas and their 
methodological justification might assist to the further understanding of the 
complicated issue of the interaction between economics and psychology. In particular, 
the paper will start with a brief sketch of the history of the relationship between 
economics and psychology, focusing also to the recent literature which points to a 
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reconsideration. In the next section there will be an examination of psychological ideas 
found in influential pre-marginalist writers. Consequently, the paper will discuss the 
arguments supporting the case for the interaction between the two fields. Emphasis will 
be placed on the methodological justification found in the works of Senior and 
Jennings. A concluding section will close the paper.   
 
II. Economics and psychology: a brief sketch 
 
The discussion of the formation of human nature and how it affects human behavior is 
very old. In the writings of Aristotle, we may find the roots of both Associationism and 
Hedonism, two intellectual movements which influenced early economists’ thought 
during the 18th and 19th centuries. Questions of human nature are significant for 
economics since they help us examine motives and behavior in economic matters. 
Although the fundamental assumption of rationality in mainstream economic theory 
“avoids the necessity of studying human thought processes (…) the psychological 
approach is relevant to economics in that it provides a more realistic basis to explain 
behavior and behavioral change” (Antonides, 1996, p. 13).  
      The interaction between economics and psychology has many episodes in the 
history of both fields. Since the 18th century, economists have usually founded their 
own economic theories on some principles and ideas about human nature; accordingly, 
economics was not independent from psychological foundations. As Peter Earl (2005, 
p. 915) points out, “if we probe more deeply into a person’s reasoning, sooner or later 
their emotional core will be reached, and the person will be unable articulate a basis for 
why a particular issue matters to them: it just ‘does’. This aspect of psychological 
economics is very much in line with the intuition of Adam Smith and David Hume and 
it naturally takes us into the origins of aesthetics (i.e., principles of good taste), and 
other customs that underpin many choices”. 
      Before the marginalist revolution, there were major writers who attempted to infuse 
psychological ideas and concepts into economics. Influenced mainly by psychological 
hedonism, these classical writers accepted a subjective theory of value and explicitly 
argued for the necessity of psychological reasoning. As will be seen in more detailed 
manner in Section III, these authors adopted many significant behavioral and 
psychological assumptions with respect to economic activities, opening the ground for 
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future developments such as the emergence of psychological economics. It seems that 
the work of Richard Jennings can be regarded as the height of this early interaction 
between economics and ideas from psychology.     
 
Marginalism and Psychology 
 
The emergence of marginalism witnessed a conceptual shift towards the marginal utility 
based theory of value followed by the gradual formation of a model of individual 
economic behavior. The concept of marginal utility was central in the theory of value 
along with the selfish maximization of pleasure or satisfaction. Most leading 
marginalists explicitly acknowledged the philosophy and psychology of Benthamite 
hedonism as their main influence. In this respect they were open in borrowing ideas 
from other intellectual areas. For instance, Jevons explicitly admits the influence of 
utilitarianism when in the introduction of his book he states: “I have no hesitation in 
accepting the Utilitarian theory of morals” (Jevons, 1871, p. 27). Furthermore, Jevons’ 
well-known definition of economics in terms of calculus of pleasure and pain indicates 
his emphasis on psychological sensations.1 Thus, in Jevons the concept of Economic 
Man is a psychological construction and already equipped with all abstractions 
necessary for the application of mathematical methods in economics (see also 
Bensusan-Butt, 1978, p. 128). In a similar vein, Walras conceives all land-owners, 
workers, and capitalists as pleasure maximizers (Walras 1874, pp. 42-43). Finally, 
Menger thought that the object of economic research was to discover those laws 
governing market phenomena which can be traced back to their ultimate genetic 
determinants in man’s physiological, psychological and social nature (Jaffe, 1976, p. 
522). 
      Psychological hedonism was the underlying framework in Edgeworth’s most 
important work Mathematical Psychics: An Essay of the Application of Mathematics to 
Moral Sciences (1881). As the title indicates and as Edgeworth himself is keen to point 
out, his main aim was: “The application of mathematics to the world of soul is 
countenanced by the hypothesis (agreeable to the general hypothesis that every 
psychical phenomenon is the concomitant, and in some sense the other side of a 
                                                          
1 “Pleasure and pain are undoubtedly the ultimate objects of the calculus of Economy (...) In other words, 
to maximize comfort and pleasure, is the problem of Economy” (Jevons, 1871, p. 44). 
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physical phenomenon), the particular hypothesis adopted in these pages, that Pleasure 
is the concomitant of Energy” (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 9). Edgeworth’s thought were 
explicitly rooted in Bentham’s utilitarianism. He was also a supporter of 
methodological individualism clearly advocating the unification of all sciences. The 
aim of a unified science of physical and mental phenomena can be found in his notion 
of “psychophysics”.  Edgeworth often cites contemporary works in psychology and 
especially the work of psychophysicists such as Weber, Fechner, and Wundt. One can 
note here the contrast with the subsequent aversion by most orthodox theorists of 
incorporating research from psychology into economics. In particular, Edgeworth 
states: 
This ‘moral arithmetic’ is perhaps to be supplemented by moral differential 
calculus, the Fechnerian method applied to pleasures in general. For Wundt has 
shown that sensuous pleasures may thereby be measured, and, as utilitarians 
hold, all pleasures are commensurable. (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 60)  
 
Edgeworth was very supportive of employing the findings of psychophysics into the 
economic and utilitarian calculus. A good example in this respect, is Fechner’s Law 
which relates the quantity of sensation to the quantity of stimulus (intensity of 
stimulus), and the stimulus threshold. In his previous work (1877), Edgeworth modified 
this “Law” in view of his subsequent hedonic calculus as follows: 
π = k│f (y)− f (β )│ 
  
where the symbols π, k, f, y and β respectively denote, “the pleasure of a sentient 
element”, “capacity for pleasure”, a function which the first differential is positive and 
the second is negative, the quantity of pleasure for stimulus and “the ‘threshold’, the 
lowest value of stimulus for which there is sense of pleasure at all”, while β and k are 
co-efficients (Edgeworth, 1877, p. 42). He will employ this relationship in order to set 
a basis for his utilitarian calculus where he ultimately links it to the Bentham’s Greatest 
Happiness Principle and even to the Malthusian relationship between the quantity of 
food and the level of population (see also Newman, 1987, pp. 90-91). 
      As was discussed, Edgeworth was in favor of incorporating psychological findings, 
but this stance should be seen in the context of his overall methodological perspective. 
Importantly, Edgeworth viewed psychological phenomena as a legitimate field for the 
application of mathematical tools. Thus, his willingness to link “hedonic calculus” from 
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psychophysics to utilitarian calculus in economics.2 In general, the dominant 
methodological framework of the time was encouraging the incorporation of ideas from 
psychology. As Bruni and Sugden rightly observe: “Neoclassical theory was based on 
assumptions about the nature of pleasure and pain. Those assumptions were broadly 
compatible with what were then recent findings in psychophysics (…) The usual 
methodology in economics at this time was John Stuart Mill’s concrete deductive 
method, by which theories about economic phenomena are arrived at by deduction from 
a set of relatively simple empirical regularities or ‘laws’ in which (it is claimed) the 
theorist can have great confidence” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, p. 149). 
 
 
The Emergence and the completion of the Paretian Turn 
 
Edgeworth’s work can be viewed as the peak of the interaction between economics and 
ideas from psychology after the marginalist revolution. However, in the closing decades 
of the nineteenth century when the second marginalist generation of economists 
emerged, the influence of positivism as the dominant scientific philosophy became 
much more prevalent (Seligman, 1969). One of the basic tenets of positivism was that 
the enormous success of the physical sciences meant that their scientific methodology 
should also be followed by the other disciplines (methodological individualism). The 
application of the methodology of physical sciences to economics, called for the 
rejection of all normative, ethical or metaphysical elements (for a discussion, see 
Mirowski, 1989). Psychological elements were also considered as value-laden and 
therefore unacceptable for the corpus of economic theory (see also Coats, 1976; Lewin, 
1996). The important consequence of this methodological stance was that many leading 
economists of the period became indifferent – or even hostile – to the findings of other 
social sciences, and especially to psychological theories. As will be seen, this tendency 
continued with subsequent mainstream economists. 
      Vilfredo Pareto was extremely influenced by the prevailing positivist scientific 
philosophy. His methodological ideal for the discipline of economics was that it should 
be a mathematical science, part of the natural sciences such as physiology and 
                                                          
2 It should be noted that Edgeworth’s psycho-economics was greatly influenced by Jevons, who in turn 
was influenced by Jennings (Edgeworth, 1881). 
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chemistry (Pareto, 1896, p. 21). In the spirit of positivism, this required that economics 
should be freed from any philosophical or psychological notions that hamper the 
application of the positivist methodology (for an extensive discussion, see 
Drakopoulos, 1997; Caldwell, 2013). In the same conceptual tradition, Pareto believed 
that the construction of the fictional model of economic man was adequate for the needs 
of economic theory, thus clearly implying that psychological findings are not necessary 
(Pareto, 1907; see also Bruni and Guala, 2001; Bruni, 2010; McLure, 2010). 
      Similarly to Pareto, Fisher was against the inclusion of psychological concepts in 
economics. His intentions are clearly stated in the beginning of his Investigations: 
 To fix the idea of utility the economist should go no farther than is serviceable 
in explaining economic facts. It is not his province to build a theory of 
psychology (Fisher, 1892, p.11).  
 
It should be pointed out that Fisher thought of psychology as a “soft” subject not worthy 
for consideration by the “hard” science of economics. In this sense, the following 
statement is indicative: “But the economist need not envelope his own science in the 
hazes of ethics, psychology, biology and metaphysics” (Fisher, 1892, p. 23). 
      Pareto’s and Fisher’s anti-psychology stance resulted in the reformulation of 
consumer theory as an allegedly psychology-free theoretical construction. The 
reformulation was completed in the works of Hicks, Allen, and Samuelson, and 
mainstream economics expelled (at least nominally) any psychological and sociological 
notions found in earlier marginalist writings (see also Drakopoulos, 1991; 2012; Davis, 
2003; Bruni and Sugden, 2007; Hands, 2010). The new concept of psychology-free 
economic rationality would also form the basis of the general equilibrium model that 
emerged during the same period (Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Arrow and Hahn, 1971). 
The extension of economic rationality in the form of axiomatic expected utility theory 
in the works of John von Neumann, Oscar Morgenstern, and Leonard Savage was also 
in the spirit of independence of any psychic state (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944; Savage, 1954). In the middle of the twentieth century, Milton Friedman’s (1953) 
essay on economic methodology was an effort to shield the rationality assumption from 
criticism mainly originating from psychological research (see also Düppe, 2011). In 
Friedman’s opinion, psychological assumptions were largely irrelevant to the validation 
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of theories (see also Sent, 2004; Muramatsu, 2009). These developments completed the 
Paretian turn of mainstream economics.3 
 
Economics and Psychology: The revival 
 
In the late 1970s, the theoretical and empirical validity of expected utility theory started 
to be questioned by psychologists Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Paul Slovic 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982).  These works 
marked the revival of psychological ideas in economic analysis. Even the mainstream 
response to this criticism was the attempt to alter the expected utility models by 
including explicit psychological variables such as regret and disappointment (e.g. 
Loomes and Sugden, 1982). Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky’s work is considered 
to have given the stimulus for the emergence of new behavioural economics. Kahneman 
and Tversky’s approach had a strong orientation towards psychology and many key 
ideas found in new behavioural economics were stimulated by psychological literature. 
Notions such as reference dependence, loss aversion, adaptation, endowment effects, 
and framing effects are commonplace in modern behavioural economics (see Rabin, 
1998; 2002). For instance, Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt acknowledge that their work 
concerning fairness is connected to the relevant psychological theories: “Our theory is 
motivated by the psychological evidence on social comparison and loss aversion” (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999, p. 856). Furthermore, some of the more recent models originating 
from the new behavioural economics draw on explicitly from findings from 
neuroscience and cognitive psychology. Their aim is to offer an improved 
understanding of how cognition and emotion might interact to bring phenomena of 
economic relevance, such as cooperation, intertemporal choice and risky decision (e.g. 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005; for a detailed discussion, see also Muramatsu, 
2009).  
      Another source of renewed interest to psychological findings relates to the rise of 
research on subjective well-being (or happiness economics). This relatively new field 
has an explicit link to psychology and especially to positive psychology. Key concepts 
of the field such as life satisfaction, positive and negative affect, quality of life, as well 
                                                          
3 Non-mainstream economics has a long history of interactions with psychology. Indicative examples are 
the works of T. Veblen and T. Scitovsky (for discussions see Frey and Benz, 2004; Drakopoulos, 2016). 
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as the cardinal approach to utility measurement indicate the strong interaction with 
psychology (e.g. Clark, Frijters and Shields, 2008). The increasing appeal of happiness 
research with its extensive use of psychological notions represents a challenging 
tendency to the mainstream resistance to explicitly interact with psychology (see also 
Frey, 2008). In short, new behavioural economics and happiness economics represent 
the main manifestations of the current revival of the interaction between economics and 
psychology. 
 
 
ΙΙΙ. Early arguments supporting the interplay between Economics and Psychology 
 
The Philosophical and Psychological Background: British Empiricism and 
Psychological Hedonism 
 
As has been mentioned, before the marginalist revolution there were various attempts 
to infuse psychology into economic discourse. Early economists intentionally 
connected their behavioural assumptions with the so-called Psychological Hedonism, a 
“doctrine” of motives generally advocated by major British philosophers since 17th 
century. This “doctrine” affirms that human beings behave according to the following 
rule: all men try to obtain (the greatest possible) pleasure and avoid pain. “Any person 
was supposed, that is, before willing any action, to make a quick calculation of the 
probable results in pleasure or pain to himself of each of the possible courses he might 
take, and then to choose and carry out that course which promises the largest hedonic 
results” (Dickinson, 1922, p. 11). 
      Thomas Hobbes (1651/1962), one of the founders of British Empiricism, regarded 
men as machines which consist of matter and motion. He adopted a hedonistic theory 
of stimulation; thus, he argued that human behavior is driven by appetites and aversions. 
In a similar vein, John Locke (1706/1974) also developed a hedonistic theory of human 
motivation. Pleasure and pain were the two basic feelings and all the other 
passions/affections like love, hatred, fear, hope, desire etc., derive from the former. 
Moreover, British empiricism developed the theory of ideas’ association or 
Associationism. For instance, George Berkeley formulated the principle of association: 
“all sensations that are consistently experienced together become associated. In fact, 
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(…) objects were aggregates of sensations and nothing more” (Hergenhahn, 2009, p. 
142).4  
      David Hume (1748/1957) also adopted the empirical tradition arguing that science 
should be founded on experience and observation. Following the previous mentioned 
authors, he further developed the three laws of association that influence humans’ 
thought: (a) the law of resemblance (b) the law of contiguity and (c) the law of cause 
and effect.5 Furthermore, Hume, like his contemporary Adam Smith, was deeply 
engaged in describing and analyzing the psychological foundations of human 
behaviour. “David Hume assigned major roles in the choice process to passions, 
stubbornness and desires for action and liveliness, as well as more obviously 
‘economic’ motives such as desires for consumption and gain” (Earl, 2005 p. 909. See 
also Angner and Loewenstein, 2012). Around the same time, Adam Smith, mainly in 
his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), dealt with the psychological aspects of choice: 
“Our continual observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form 
ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to 
be avoided (…) Those general rules of conduct, when they have been fixed in our mind 
by habitual reflection, are of great use in correcting the misrepresentation of self-love 
concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular situation” (Smith, 1759, 
p. 141). Smith, in the Wealth of Nations, regarded self-interest and self-love as the 
fundamental motives of human motivation and action. However, in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, by recognizing the plurality of human incentives, he emphasizes the 
pleasure of mutual sympathy: “How selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it” (Ibid, p. 4). Smith’s interest in the influence of emotion and 
sentiment on socio-psychological motivation, “foreshadows a number of areas in 
                                                          
4 It is here noteworthy that a similar empiricist tradition existed in France through the work of French 
sensualist authors who stressed the significance of senses towards the attempt to explain any conscious 
experience. As well as the afore-mentioned British philosophers, Sensationalists argued that all ideas 
derive from experience, underlying the significance of the laws of association. Etienne Bonnot Abbe de 
Condillac has been regarded as a genuine representative of French sensualism. His work includes 
significant psychological treatises such as the Traité des sensations (1754). In economics, his work 
Commerce and Government (1776) is essential since here Condillac contributes to utility and its impact 
on human motivation. Condillac, as well as Galliani and Turgot, may be the first writers who explicitly 
connect value and utility. 
5 David Hartley was another writer who extended the principles of association as those had been 
formulated by Hobbes, Locke, etc. 
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modern behavioural economics, particularly models of social influence” (Baddeley, 
2013, p. 5. See also Nagatsu, 2015). 
      During the first decades of the 19th century, associationist psychology was further 
developed. One of the most complete overviews of the theory of association was James 
Mill’s An Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829/1869). Mill, influenced 
by Hume, Hartley and Thomas Brown, “attempted to show that the mind consisted of 
only sensations and ideas held together by contiguity. He insisted that any mental 
experience could be reduced to the simple ideas that made it up. Thus, he gave us a 
conception of the mind based on Newtonian physics. For Newton, the universe could 
be understood as consisting of material elements held together by physical forces and 
behaving in a predictable manner. For Mill, the mind consisted of mental elements held 
together by the laws of association; therefore, mental experience was as predictable as 
physical events” (Hergenhahn, 2009, p. 154). Mill’s approach was consistent with the 
attempt of those political economists like Richard Jennings who investigated the 
“natural laws” of human action with respect to economic matters.  
      Furthermore, both James and John Stuart Mill were influenced by Bentham and the 
utilitarian principles. Jeremy Benham was the leading figure of utilitarianism. The 
ancient notion of hedonism (from the Greek word ηδονή-hedone which means pleasure) 
is found in the core of Bentham’s philosophical and political theory (Drakopoulos, 
1991). According to Bentham’s philosophy, human happiness depends on our ability to 
secure pleasure and avoid pain. Thus, individual actions and most importantly, 
government policies were judged in terms of the greatest amount of happiness to the 
greatest number of people (Bentham, 1823, pp. 1-2; 1882). Due to his emphasis on the 
quantification of happiness and the development of a hedonic calculus, Bentham has 
been regarded as one of the intellectual forebears of today’s happiness, well-being and 
behavioral economics literatures (Baddeley, 2013; Quinn, 2016). However, “it must be 
emphasized that for Bentham as for his followers, utility was a psychological (or 
physiological) magnitude which measured an individual’s inner happiness; it was not, 
as it is in many modern texts, simply a proxy for the degree to which an individual has 
reached what-ever goals he seeks (Lewin, 1996, p.  1297).6  
                                                          
6 Shira Lewin develops one of the main objections against hedonism when she points out that 
“Psychological hedonists such as Alexander Bain (1859) attempt to use only one human motive to 
explain all of human activity (…) they assume without foundation that behavior always aims at the goal 
of maximum pleasure and minimum pain; but behavior is often impulsive, not goal-oriented (…) Even 
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      To sum up, British Empiricism has been associated with psychological hedonism. 
The concentration was upon the feelings of pleasure and pain. In particular, men pursue 
the greatest amount of pleasure/happiness and try to avoid pain. “All knowledge is 
considered to be built up from simple sensations by means of association, and all 
motives in the same fashion are derived from the added dynamic character of sensations 
in being pleasant or painful” (Dickinson, 1922, p. 67).  
 
Classical Economists: Psychological assumptions and economic motives 
 
Apart from the major authors mentioned above, the psychological bases of economic 
behavior were a subject that captured the interest of many other significant figures of 
the classical school. Senior’s tutor Richard Whately, on his Introductory Lectures on 
Political Economy (1831), introduced some psychological motives or human instincts 
related to the “Science of Exchanges”. More precisely, the “inclination for self-
indulgence and ostentation” as well as the desire for a variety of consumption goods 
are some of the most characteristic incentives of human beings with respect to economic 
behavior. “The main result of such incentives is the emergence of emulation among 
men (…). This emulation activity results in an increased work effort and production 
activity that will increase economic development (…)” (Karayiannis, 2001, p. 21). 
Thus, Whately analysed the spirit of emulation and how it is connected to wealth: “As 
wealth increased, the continued stimulus of emulation would make each man strive to 
surpass, or at least not fall below, his neighbours, in this” (1831, p. 157). However, he 
pointed out that both the desire of wealth and emulation are not, in themselves, either 
virtuous or vicious. The final outcome depends on the way that men utilize these 
motives (see Ibid, p. 158).  
     Whately’s student Mountifort Longfield, on his Lectures on Political Economy 
(1833), argued that value depends on demand and supply. Effectual demand is 
associated with utility, while supply is related to the cost of production. Furthermore, 
he mentioned the motive for variety (“the love or necessity of variety”) in determining 
the extension of demand for luxury goods and connected (positively) this incentive with 
work effort (Longfield, 1833, p. 44). He also explicitly connected consumption with 
                                                          
if pleasure and pain were well-defined magnitudes, it would still be unrealistic to model people as so 
goal-oriented that they always sought the hedonic optimum” (Lewin, 1996, pp. 1299-1300). 
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enjoyment. In his own words: “By enjoyment I understand every advantage or pleasure 
which the consumer derives from the use of the article, without the mediation of any 
exchange” (Ibid, p. 166). 
      According to J. E. Cairnes, Political Economy depends equally on physical and 
mental laws and stands in precisely the same relation to physical as to mental nature 
(Cairnes, 1857/1869, p. 23). Due to this complex character, the laws of political 
economy depend both on the laws of matter and on those of mind. In The Character 
and Method of Political Economy (1857/1869, p. 24), Cairnes argues that “psychology 
is a mental science, the subject matter of it being mental states and feelings (…) the 
psychologist (…) consists in endeavoring by means of reflection on what passes in his 
own mind, to ascertain the laws by which the phenomena of our mental constitution 
succeed and produce each other”. He was a proponent of introspection when he argued 
that “those principle of the science which require no proof, depending directly upon 
consciousness, as for example, the desire for wealth and the aversion to labour, they 
have silently assumed, proceeding at once to argue on them without formally stating 
them” (Ibid, p. 59). The method of introspection, whose power was widely accepted 
among social scientists of that period, was not inconsistent with the premises of hedonic 
psychology. Economists’ reliance on this method led them to see “little reason to use 
alternative methods to confirm the empirical adequacy of the foundations of their 
economics” (Angner and Loewenstein, 2012, p. 647. See also Bruni and Sugden, 2007). 
Although from the above remarks the association of psychology with economics may 
be unavoidable, it is worth stressing here that Cairnes seems to be quite skeptical about 
a strong connection between the two fields. In his own words: “nothing but confusion 
and error could arise from extending economic inquiry beyond the limits which have 
hitherto been observed” (Cairnes, 1857/1869, p. 182). Consequently, despite Cairnes’ 
recognition of the complex character of political economy, it seems that he is one of the 
first economists who explicitly cast doubt on the relevance of psychology for 
economics.  
      On the other hand, Nassau Senior “explicitly emphasized the variety of human 
motives more than any other classical economist (including J. S. Mill) in justifying his 
methodological views, not only in regard to the character of economics, but also in the 
way that its premises may be deduced” (Karayiannis, 2001, p. 19). Additionally, he 
stressed the fact that in order to explain economic behavior we should first examine the 
various principles and motives that shape human economic action. He considered “the 
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desire for wealth” as the fundamental human motive, since it is “the cornerstone of the 
doctrine of wages and profits, and, generally speaking, of exchange. In short, it is in 
Political Economy what gravitation is in Physics” (Senior, 1836, p. 28). Furthermore, 
according to Senior, the fundamental factors that determine products’ value are utility, 
transferableness and limitation in supply. The last, which is regarded by him as the most 
significant of the three, is influenced by “two of the most powerful principles of human 
nature, the love of variety, and the love of distinction” (Ibid, p.  11).7 The psychological 
basis of these two principles is evident. 
      Senior’s economic analysis was based upon the hedonistic principle, stating that 
“every man desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible” (Ibid, 
p. 26). Accordingly, “the ‘desire for wealth’ motive is explained by Senior not only 
through the self-interest principle (…) but, furthermore, by the motives for variety and 
distinction, as wealth determines individual’s rank in society (…) and is a standard of 
‘power and pre-eminence’ in the civilized countries (…) (Karayiannis, 2001, p. 20). In 
addition, Senior “introduced as a by-product of the ‘desire for wealth’ the profit motive, 
in explaining not only the allocation of resources among the various production 
activities, but also the accumulation of capital through the abstinence behavior” (Ibid, 
p. 24). In other words, the idea of profit as remuneration for the cost of “abstinence” 
included psychological elements for the explanation of interest, an approach that would 
be adopted later on by the Austrian School.  
 
The precursors of marginalists: Utility and the subjective/psychological theory of 
value 
 
Before the marginalist revolution, there were authors who, influenced mainly by 
psychological hedonism, adopted a subjective theory of value. Their analysis relied 
upon subjectivist psychological notions and explicitly argued for the necessity of 
psychological reasoning. Thus, some of them have been regarded as definite 
forerunners of the marginalist approach. 
                                                          
7 It is here noteworthy that “the desire for distinction” can also be found on other contemporary writers 
such as John Rae and William Whewell (see White, 1992, p. 69). John Rae (1834) placed also emphasis 
on the conspicuous consumption behavior, explaining it “as a consequence of the rich individuals’ 
selfishness and vanity” (Karayiannis, 2001, p. 23). 
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      W.F. Lloyd, in the Lecture on the Notion of Value (1833/1834), developed 
arguments for the distinction between value and utility. An explicit description of the 
law of diminishing marginal utility can also be found in this work (see 1833/1834, pp. 
11-12). Lloyd claimed that the value of an object is proportional to want and arises out 
of it. “(…) the value, properly speaking, is the feeling of affection or esteem for the 
object, arising from a sense of the loss of the gratification contingent on the loss of the 
object. In its ultimate sense, then, the term undoubtedly signifies a feeling of the mind, 
which shows itself always at the margin of separation between the satisfied and 
unsatisfied wants” (Ibid, p. 16). Hence, it is clear that Lloyd adopted a 
subjective/psychological theory of value, as the previous and the following quotations 
reveal: “The term value, therefore, does not express a quality inherent in a commodity. 
It expresses (…) a feeling of the mind, and is variable with the variations of the external 
circumstances which can influence that feeling, without any variation of the intrinsic 
qualities of the commodity which is the object of it” (Ibid, p. 31). 
      T. C. Banfield was also a proponent of the subjective theory of value, regarding it 
as a revolution in economics. It is indicative that Jevons considers Banfield as one of 
his major sources of inspiration (Jevons, 1871, p. 41). In his Four Lectures on the 
Organization of Industry (1844/48) Banfield writes:  “Not any intrinsic qualities in the 
objects (…) but the utility which the consumer expects to desire from them that gives 
to each its value” (1844, p. 17). The tastes, the wants and the feelings of men are all 
determining factors of products’ value. Accordingly, the value of an object differs 
between individuals (as between nations), since it is a matter of the estimation of each 
person. “We see that the range of human desires which passes the limit of physical 
wants, and includes moral advantages as well as objects of sense does not lie beyond 
the sphere of the political economists” (Ibid, p. 13). Following Senior, Banfield stressed 
the importance of “the gradations of the wants of man” which substantially affect value. 
Moreover, he strongly criticizes Ricardo and his followers because they were 
“incompetent to discriminate between the mind and the nerves by which the mental 
powers are called into activity” (Ibid, p. i). The criticism has an obvious psychological 
bend. 
      Many contemporary writers view Hermann Heinrich Gossen as an explicit 
precursor of marginalists. Through his laws of pleasure, he offered a mathematically 
founded theory and philosophy of pleasures, which can be defined as “the feeling 
experienced during enjoyment” (see Georgescu-Roegen, 1983, p. lxxix). As 
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Georgescu-Roegen points out, Gossen adopted a so-called hedonistic epistemology: 
“each man endeavors to make his life as full of pleasure as possible” (Ibid, p. xxxiii). 
Gossen’s chief rule for human conduct was the following: “Man should organize his 
life so that his total life pleasure becomes a maximum” (1854/1983, p. 5). The first 
sentence in his book states that “man wants to enjoy life and makes it his goal to 
increase pleasures enjoyed throughout life to the highest possible level” (Ibid, p. 3). 
Thus, Gossen’s purpose was the examination of “the laws according to which the force 
of enjoyment operates” (Ibid, p. 6). By criticizing the limitations of political economy, 
he speaks of the science of pleasure, which extends the limit purposes of economics 
(Ibid, pp. 38-39). 
      In short, the afore-mentioned authors considered that psychological assumptions 
are not irrelevant to economics in that they provide a more sound or realistic basis to 
explicate economic behaviour and elucidate substantial economic issues like products’ 
value. Accordingly, they connect value with psychological features and affective states 
like the “feelings of the mind” and try to associate economics with psychological laws. 
These authors foreshadow early neoclassical economists (e.g. Jevons) who “understood 
utility in terms of conscious experience like pleasure or happiness” (Angner and 
Loewenstein, 2012, p. 646). 
 
IV. The work of Richard Jennings: The peak of the early interaction between 
economics and psychology 
 
Richard Jennings was one of the first economists who tried to extensively use principles 
of psychology in his work. He offered a psychological theory of economic behavior and 
his work may be regarded as the most complete early attempt to relate the study of 
physiology and psychology to economics. Jennings argued that political economy deals 
with the relationship between human nature (physiology) and human behavior 
(psychology). By having an adequate knowledge of natural sciences and following the 
British empiricist tradition which is represented by authors like James Mill, Jennings 
attempted to reform/modify the character of the science of political economy. In his 
most significant work entitled Natural Elements of Political Economy (1855), he sought 
to analyze the mental and physical phenomena that influence human economic behavior 
in order to form scientific laws that describe/explain the relevant human actions (1855, 
pp. 10-11). According to Jennings, if we want to find common economic laws and 
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universal principles, we should carefully examine how the combination of 
psychological and physiological factors affects human economic actions (Ibid, pp. 16, 
20-21). In other words, the fundamental principles of psychology were the 
“groundwork of political economy”; thus, it is necessary for the understanding of 
political economy to start exploring the postulates of psychology. In his framework, the 
starting point is the explanation of the function of human mind through introspection, 
a key tool for 19th century psychology. In particular, we should explain the mental laws 
which govern human actions and incentives: Political economy deals only with those 
incentives related to the “attraction of gratification and the avoidance of pain”. It does 
not concern with moral or religious matters. In order to avoid giving a metaphysical 
aspect in these incentives, we should recur to physiology (Ibid, pp. 45-46, 81 and 88).    
      Furthermore, Jennings argued that deduction was the proper methodology of doing 
economic research, and held that the abstract method is the best methodology for the 
scientific examination of the fundamental economic laws. Through the abstract method 
and the simultaneous use of mathematical techniques, the social scientist can combine 
the fields of psychology and physiology in order to analyze the economic phenomena 
(Ibid, pp. 9, 20, 33 and 35). 
      Jennings was convinced that human beings are influenced by two forces: pleasure 
and pain. These two forces provide different incentives to man, especially with respect 
to economic issues (Ibid, p. 45). In particular, the economic activities of exchange, 
consumption and production cause two kinds of emotions/feelings to man: indifference 
and the sense of pleasure or pain (Ibid, p. 85). Unlike pain or pleasure, indifference 
cannot lead to an economic action (Ibid, p. 86). For example, consumption causes 
pleasure and production (not in all cases however) pain. More precisely, the pleasure 
that an individual enjoys from the consumption of goods constitutes the basis of 
exchanges, while the pain that caused to man from work constitutes the basis of labour 
and production (Ibid, pp. 70, 81-83).  
      Let now examine the role that pleasure plays on the determination of products’ and 
services’ value. For Jennings, man enjoys different degrees of pleasure from the 
consumption of different quantities of a commodity, namely pleasure is a function of 
the disposable quantity for consumption (Ibid, pp. 97, 183). In the words of Jennings, 
“the purpose of our present inquiry leads us now to examine, by the evidence of our 
own feelings, the changes in the degree and the duration of sensations that are 
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occasioned by changes in the quantity of the Commodities by which they are excited 
(…)” (Ibid, p. 93). 
      Jennings approached in a pioneering way the causal relationship between the feeling 
from consumption (pleasure or utility) and the consumed quantity. In particular, the 
consumption utility increases with diminishing return as the quantity consumed 
increases – the law of diminishing utility (Ibid, pp. 97-99). In his own words: “the 
increments of sensation resulting from equal increments of the Commodity are 
obviously less and less at each step” (Ibid, p. 99). Thus, Jennings acknowledges the 
marginal relationship that exists between quantity and satisfaction, stressing that each 
successive further quantity of the consumed commodity provides gradually less and 
less pleasure to the consumer (Ibid, p. 209). This causal relationship determines the 
value of commodities, which, however, cannot be measured with accuracy (Ibid, pp. 
177-178). 
      In contrast to other previous or contemporary economists who claimed that 
products’ value is derived from labour, land or money, Jennings argued that there is a 
close relationship between exchange value and the feeling of satisfaction or the 
avoidance of pain that every object offers. In this context, “the feeling of satisfaction 
eventually grows into the conception of value” (Ibid, p. 182), which is a “complex 
mental conception”. In other words, prices are dependent on sensations. Additionally, 
the value of a commodity is derived from the past pleasure that individuals have 
enjoyed and this feature accompanies the commodities with respect to the present or 
future satisfaction that give to men (Ibid). The influence of past experience on the 
current commodity’s evaluation is more than obvious. In his own words, “(…) the 
degrees of satisfaction which will arise from the Consumption of existing or of future 
quantities: on this ground they act, and by their united acts indicate the Exchangeable 
Value of each Commodity” (Ibid, p. 183). Moreover, the exchange value of the 
commodities that cause positive feelings (satisfaction/pleasure) is analogous to the 
degree of emotion that cause.  
      As far as the theory of labour is concerned, Jennings may be regarded as a precursor 
of the neoclassical approach. More precisely, the similarities with Jevons’ theory of 
labour are more than obvious.8 According to Jennings, labour has a “positive value on 
account of its pecuniary reward (…) [and] a negative value on account of the toilsome 
                                                          
8 Jevons explicitly acknowledged Jennings’ influence on his analysis. See also White, 1994. 
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feelings” (Ibid, p. 187; brackets added). The basic hypothesis of his analysis was man’s 
“aversion to toil in different degrees”. Hence, as work effort increases, the toilsome 
sensation increases in a more rapid way: “The degree of toilsome sensation would 
increase and would become insupportable, if the work should be protracted 
indefinitely” (Ibid, p. 118). 
      Jennings pointed out that Physiological and Psychological evidence of his time 
showed that “actions can be (…) performed without the attention or the intention or 
even the excitement of consciousness in the mind of the agent, being the simply 
automatic or instinctive effects of either Sensations, Ideas or Emotions” (Ibid, p. 137). 
Accordingly, he placed emphasis on human reflex actions, arguing that “a variety of 
experiments can prove that any mental state is the efficient cause of any bodily action 
(…) If certain sensations be excited, certain actions may be caused by them without the 
intention or the consciousness of the individual” (Ibid, p. 138). Actions of political 
economy “naturally follow the occurrence of certain states of mind and only meet with 
occasional disturbances from the intervention of the will” (Ibid, p. 141). Thus, there is 
a natural connection between certain states of mind and certain actions, as a cause and 
effect mechanism. For that reason, “predictions of the future course of Production, 
Interchange and Consumption cease to be empirical, since it is now only necessary to 
determine their causes and to deduce from them the natural consequences” (Ibid, p. 
142). In addition, Jennings tried to explicitly link the laws of association to the 
industrial actions. The process of “Mental Combination”, viz. the combination of two 
ideas may lead to a different result compared to the original ideas, “renders possible the 
modes of Consumption, of Production and of Interchange, that are carried on in human 
societies” (Ibid, p. 166). 
      Jennings’ attempt to build a (psychological) theory of economic relations that relied 
upon subjectivist psychological concepts, has been in contrast to mainstream 
economists’ view on an economic science that deals only with rational behavior on a 
basis of e.g. some well-structured preferences, whatever the actual psychological cause. 
“(…) Before the Paretian turn, neoclassical economics was based on what was then 
state-of-the-art research on the psychology of sensation (…) what we see as the ‘road 
not taken’ is a potential continuation of nineteenth-century neoclassical economics, 
leading in the direction of behavioural economics” (Bruni and Sugden, 2007, p. 147). 
Jennings seems to be chiefly influenced by the theory of association, which was the 
dominant psychological theory in the early 1840’s. He explicitly cited Carpenter’s 
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Principles of Human Physiology (1842) and the related laws of the association of ideas, 
which supply the fundamental principles of explaining all mental phenomena. 
Furthermore, according to Michael White, Jennings, by relying upon physiological 
psychology, clearly differentiated himself from previous authors at least with respect 
to two aspects: “First, Jennings showed that it was possible to distinguish between 
‘natural laws’ of behavior and the social manifestations of those laws (…) Instead of 
an undifferentiated ‘man’, there was the human body conceptualized as a 
neurophysiological system/organism. Social behavior could then be accounted for by 
the organism’s environment and could be observed with statistics. Second, the new 
theoretical object of the body enabled a different conceptualization of behavior to 
explain the ‘system of action’ (…) [Jennings] showed that it was possible to posit a 
theory of action with a calculating neurophysiological organism” (White, 1994, pp. 
213-214; brackets added). 
       
V. Conclusions 
      
The dominance of mainstream economics since the second half of the twentieth century 
had effectively closed the issue of the relationship between economics and other social 
disciplines, and especially psychology. The increasing influence of positivism and of 
the physics scientific ideal resulted in the Paretian turn which isolated mainstream 
economics from psychology. However, the rise of new behavioral economics and of 
the economics of happiness with their extensive use of psychological concepts, is the 
main reason for the recent revival of the discussion concerning the relationship of 
economics and psychology. The current discussion concerning the role of 
psychological assumptions and findings has important methodological and theoretical 
implications. The issue has also a strong historical bend given that the relationship 
between the two has had a continuous presence in the history of economic thought.  
      In order to investigate the topic, and after a brief sketch of the major historical 
episodes of the interaction between the two, the paper focused on psychological ideas 
found in influential pre-marginalist economists. It was observed that early authors on 
economics matters such as T. Hobbes, and J. Locke intentionally connected their 
behavioural assumptions with Psychological Hedonism. Subsequently, David Hume 
was deeply engaged in describing and analyzing the psychological foundations of 
human behavior. Hume’s contemporary Adam Smith dealt with the psychological 
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aspects of choice by recognizing the plurality of human incentives. The trend continued 
in the works of James and John Stuart Mill who were influenced by Bentham and the 
utilitarian principles. The psychological bases of economic behavior were a subject that 
captured the interest of many other significant figures of the classical school such as R. 
Whately and M. Longfield. Nassau Senior explicitly emphasized the variety of human 
motives more than any other classical economist. Many of the precursors of 
marginalists such as W. F. Lloyd, T. Banfield and H. Gossen adopted a 
subjective/psychological theory of value. Their analysis relied upon subjectivist 
psychological notions and explicitly argued for the necessity of psychological 
reasoning. 
    The work of R. Jennings was the peak of the early interaction between economics 
and psychology. He was one of the first economists who tried to extensively use 
principles of psychology in his work. He offered a psychological theory of economic 
behavior and his work may be regarded as the most complete early attempt to relate the 
study of physiology and psychology to economics. Jennings’ psychological approach 
to economics influenced W. S. Jevons as the similarities of their theories of labour 
clearly demonstrate and as Jevons himself admits. Most of the leading marginalists 
freely adopted concepts and ideas from psychology. The work of F.Y Edgeworth is a 
clear example of this trend. 
      In general, our discussion indicates that apart for leading marginalists, the 
incorporation of psychological ideas was commonplace for many major classical 
authors too. In particular, one can distinguish a continuity in the line of thinking of 
Whately – Senior – Banfield – Jennings –Jevons and Edgeworth (see also White, 1994). 
For this line of thinking, the integration of psychological concepts to economic 
argumentation was considered as methodologically admissible and useful. The fact that 
most figures were well aware of its implications for economics is also supported by 
Cairnes’ explicit objection to Jennings’ attempt to marry economics and psychology. 
      Contrary to the mainstream economics attitude towards psychology that emerged 
with the Paretian turn, the study of the pre-marginalist economic thought indicates that 
there were no methodological objections against using concepts, findings and ideas 
from psychology. This is in sharp contrast with the subsequent anti-psychologism that 
dominated mainstream economic methodology and theory. It also counters the 
prevailing idea that major economists of the past were not interested in psychological 
notions. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the mainstream attitude towards psychology 
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and towards other neighboring social fields is the product of a specific methodological 
framework which emerged rather recently. The current debate regarding the 
methodological and theoretical implications of the rejection of anti-psychologism can 
certainly benefit from the history of the relation between the two fields of study. 
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